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A B S T R A C T
In this paper we describe and analyze the Extrajudicial System for Labor Conflict Resolution in Andalusia. 
We begin by emphasizing the major relevance of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in a European 
context and the need to benefit from different ADR experiences. Next, we comment on the situation in 
Spain and focus on the Andalusia’s system. This system was created by an interprofessional agreement 
between the most representative employers’ union and the two largest trade unions with the support of 
the national government. During the first fourteen years more than 4,500 conflicts have been submitted 
affecting more than 400,000 companies and 3,000,000 employees. Collective mediations are conducted by 
a team of four mediators, two of them appointed by the principal employers association, and the two other 
by the two largest trade unions. 
© 2014 Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos de Madrid. Production by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights reserved. 
Cómo se transforma a los negociadores en mediadores. La mediación en los 
conflictos laborales en Andalucía
R E S U M E N
En este trabajo analizamos el Sistema Extrajudicial de Conflictos Laborales de Andalucía. Comenzamos por 
enfatizar la relevancia de los mecanismos extrajudiciales de resolución de conflictos en Europa y la necesi-
dad de beneficiarnos de las diferentes experiencias. A continuación comentamos la situación en España, 
focalizando en el caso del sistema andaluz. Este sistema fue creado por un acuerdo entre los sindicatos más 
representativos y la patronal con el apoyo del gobierno autonómico. Durante los 14 años de vigencia del 
sistema se han tratado más de 4.500 conflictos, que afectaban a más de 400.000 organizaciones y a tres 
millones de empleados. El sistema de mediación está formado por un equipo de cuatro mediadores, dos 
pertenecientes a las principales centrales sindicales y dos a la confederación de empresarios.
© 2014 Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos de Madrid. Producido por Elsevier España, S.L. Todos los derechos reservados.
Nowadays there is a general dissatisfaction with the Administration 
of Justice (Verdonschot, Barendrecht, & Kamminga, 2008). In the 
United States, this dissatisfaction was obvious during the Pounds 
Conference, where prestigious jurists and lawyers expressed their 
worries about the increase in the costs, delays, and workload of the 
Administration of Justice. In Europe, the necessity for improving 
the access to justice encouraged the Council of Europe to create the 
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) with 
the objective (among others) of promoting the effective 
implementation of the Council of Europe’s instruments for the 
judicial organization (CEPEJ, 2010). In Spain, the III Barometer of 
the Observatory of the Judicial Activity exposed the discredit of the 
Spanish Administration of Justice because 65% of the interviewed 
considered that the Spanish Administration of Justice works “bad or 
very bad” (Fundación Wolters Kluwer, 2012). 
This general dissatisfaction is caused by a “gap in the access to 
justice”. This gap is understood as the difference between the type of 
protection that individuals need from the legal system and what 
those systems are able to offer (Barendrecht et al., 2008). Mediation 
has been one of the tools proposed in order to lessen this gap. In this 
sense, it is worth mentioning that the concept of access to justice has 
recently evolved. Traditionally, international instruments for the 
protection of human rights have codified the concept of access to 
justice as the “right to an effective remedy by the competent na-
tional tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted by 
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the constitution or by law”(Article 8 of the UDHR), “the right to a fair 
and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tri-
bunal established by law” (Article 14 of the ICCPR), or “the right to a 
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law” (Article 6 of the ECHR). 
Today, the right to access to justice goes beyond this definition and it 
is understood as the right to access to adequate dispute resolution 
mechanisms and not only the right to access to courts (EC, 2004). 
Following this approach, Carretero (2011) claims that we should look 
for different models for dispute resolution in Europe with the objec-
tive of offering more and better responses to people’s legal needs, 
and using one or another mechanism should depend on the nature 
of the problem. Therefore, mediation has an important role to per-
form in the new concept of access to justice and the state has an 
important role to safeguard the right of access to justice.
Mediation is understood as one one of the most constructive 
methods for conflict resolution (Brett, Goldberg, & Ury, 1990). Devel-
oping an in-depth knowledge of how different mediation systems 
are functioning is essential to benefit from them and to suggest rel-
evant research questions for the mediation practice. We will present 
a paper with the following structure: we begin by emphasizing the 
increasing relevance of mediation in Europe and next we describe 
the Extrajudicial System for Labor Conflict Resolution in Andalusia 
(Spain).
Mediation in Europe
Mediation is an assisted negotiation by a third neutral, the me-
diator, who differently from judges and arbitrators has no power to 
impose a solution for the parties (Goldberg et al., 1999). We follow 
the concept of mediation stated in the Directive 2008/52/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain 
aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters (EU Directive 
on Mediation) which establishes that “mediation means a structured 
process, however named or referred to, whereby two or more parties 
to a dispute attempt by themselves, on a voluntary basis, to reach an 
agreement on the settlement of their dispute with the assistance of 
a mediator. This process may be initiated by the parties or suggested 
or ordered by a court or prescribed by the law of a member state” 
(Dir. 2008/52/EC,3).
In Europe, the mediation is developing at a lower pace than in 
other countries such as United States, Australia or Argentina; how-
ever, the value of mediation has been recognized by the most impor-
tant international organizations in Europe. For instance, the Council 
of Europe has elaborated different recommendations in this matter 
such as Recommendation (98) 1 on Family Mediation, Recommenda-
tion (2002) 10 on Civil Mediation, Recommendation (99) concerning 
mediation in penal matters, Recommendation (2001) 9 on alterna-
tives to litigation between administrative authorities and private 
parties, and Recommendation (2002) 10 on mediation in civil mat-
ters. The European Union published in 2002 the Green Book on Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution in Civil and Commercial Law in which it 
highlights the potential of mediation as an alternative dispute reso-
lution. And, in 2008 the European Directive on Mediation (European 
Union, 2008) was approved with the objective of establishing media-
tion procedures for cross-border disputes in civil and commercial 
matters. Despite the fact that the obligation lies only for cross-border 
disputes, the Directive encourages the establishment of mediation 
procedures for internal conflicts as well. 
The promotion of mediation by the European Union has encour-
aged the proliferation of pilot projects on the implementation of me-
diation procedures and cooperation projects with the aim of spread-
ing the culture of mediation through Europe. For instance, EIRENE 
(2012) is a project in which different countries of the EU cooperate 
in order to implement a communication strategy at the EU level for 
the promotion of mediation. Its main objective is to develop the cul-
ture of mediation as an identity symbol of Europe. Another example 
is the creation of the European Association of Judges for Mediation 
(GEMME), which associates professionals of the European Union, 
Council of Europe, and eventually also the Latin-American countries 
willing to use alternative dispute resolution systems and specially 
court-connected mediation measures (European Association of Judg-
es for Mediation; GEMME-España, 2007).
In the directive 52/2008/EC of European Parliament, mediation is 
promoted as a mechanism which is a quicker, simpler and a more 
cost-efficient way to solve disputes. This mechanism allows for 
taking into account a wider range of interests of the parties, with a 
greater chance of reaching an agreement which will be voluntarily 
respected. It also allows the preservation of an amicable and 
sustainable relationship between them. The Commission considered 
that mediation holds an untapped potential as a dispute resolution 
method.
Alternative dispute resolution procedures are already a key 
component of dispute resolution in industrial relations in all the 
member states. These procedures have demonstrated their usefulness 
with regard to the resolution of individual and collective disputes 
related to both conflicts of interest and rights conflicts. However, 
procedures vary from one member state to another (European 
Commission, 2002). Also, new procedures, laws, and ADR methods 
are introduced in different ways. In the Council meeting on 
employment and social policy in Brussels (2001), the European 
Council (1999) recognized that non-judicial dispute resolution 
mechanisms contribute to resolve disputes and play an important 
role in existing systems of industrial relations. The European Council 
welcomed the Commission’s intention to deepen the understanding 
of how dispute resolution mechanisms are organized and function in 
the area of industrial relations. The degree of implementation of this 
Directive has recently been assessed in order to discover the reasons 
for its low impact in Europe. The outcome of this research was 
published in a document titled “Rebooting the mediation directive: 
Assessing the limited impact of its implementation and proposing 
measures to increase the number of mediations in the EU”, which 
was presented in February 2014 in Brussels. This report develops the 
“Paradox of Mediation in the European Union” that highlights that 
despite the multiple benefits of mediation and the support of the 
European Union, the European Commission and most of the 
Governments, mediation has only been used in 1% of the civil and 
commercial disputes that have arisen in Europe (European 
Parliament, 2014). As this study suggests, we are living a new phase 
in the integration of mediation in the judicial systems of the 
European states. The regulation of mediation is not homogeneous 
through Europe. Some states have completely legislated the process 
of mediation. For instance, in United Kingdom, the Advisory, 
Conciliation, and Arbitration Services (ACAS) offer mediation services 
for any phase of the labor disputes before and after the judicial 
procedure is open. While some European countries have extensive 
legal rules on the subject (Lithuania), other countries have no specific 
provisions pertaining to dispute resolution (the Netherlands), and 
others already have a rooted tradition of mediation based primarily 
on self-regulation such as Spain. In Spain, the development of 
mediation is new, with the first formal proposal developed in 1996, 
and there is still limited regulation depending on the region and the 
jurisdiction. There are a few regional laws on mediation and one law 
at the national level that implements the EU Mediation Directive 
(Ley 5/2012, de 6 de julio, de mediación en asuntos civiles y 
mercantiles a través de la cual se implementa en España la Directiva 
Europea sobre Mediación). Recently, in December 2013, the Spanish 
government has published a Royal Decree developing certain aspects 
of this Spanish Act on mediation, such as the Public Registry of 
Mediators, the compulsory liability insurance, and the requirements 
for the establishment of on-line mediation procedures for claims 
below 600€.
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From an international research perspective, mediation has been 
studied in several contexts across different countries, such as: Ma-
laysian Community Mediation (Wall & Callister, 1999); Community 
and Family Mediation in the People’s Republic of China (Wall, Sohn, 
Cleeton, & Jin, 1995), Community and Industrial Mediation in South 
Korea (Kim, Wall, Sohn, & Kim, 1993), Japanese Community and Or-
ganizational Mediation (Callister & Wall, 1997), and Mediation in the 
South Africa Construction Industry (Povey, Cattell, & Michell, 2005). 
Within the European context, several studies on mediation have also 
been conducted. For instance, Bollen and Euwema (2013) analyzed 
the important influence of culture and feedback loops on the prac-
tice of workplace mediation; Blain, Goodman, and Loewnberg (1987) 
compared Australia, Great Britain, and the United States on media-
tion, conciliation, and arbitration and noticed the general lack of in-
ternational comparative studies on these issues; Rodriguez-Piñero, 
Rey, and Munduate (1993) emphasized the relevance of non-judicial 
methods for labor conflict resolution in Western European countries. 
Some authors have provided an overview of the French legislation 
regarding mediation and have focused particularly on internal me-
diation within a private firm (Rojot, Le Franchec, & Landrieux-Karto-
chian, 2005). Corby (2000) has made comparisons between Great 
Britain and New Zealand, but considering only unfair dismissal dis-
putes, and De Palo and Harley (2005) have explored the apparent 
contradiction between a great amount of mediation-related legisla-
tion in Italy and the scarce number of mediated cases. De Palo and 
Harley also conclude that any country seeking to encourage the 
widespread adoption of mediation would do well to heed the experi-
ence of other states. 
In the particular context of European industrial relations, there 
are two interesting studies that compare the different alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms in several European countries. On 
the one hand, “Settling Labor Disputes” (De Roo & Jagtengberg, 1994) 
is a comparative study that describes and compares the dispute reso-
lution systems available in the field of industrial relations in several 
countries of the European Union. On the other hand, Valdés Dal-Re 
(2002) elaborated in 2002 a report for the European Commission on 
dispute resolution in collective conflicts. However, to benefit from 
these experiences, literature on mediation should devote extra ef-
forts to describe and analyze how mediation systems are functioning 
in different countries.
Mediation System in Andalusia
Spain lacked a tradition in the use of alternative dispute resolu-
tion (ADR) (Munduate, Ganaza, Alcaide, & Peiró, 1994). Rey (1992) 
mentions several reasons for this lack of ADR. Firstly, the general lack 
of confidence in third parties, except for judicial authorities, to solve 
labor conflicts before the establishment of the Spanish democracy; 
secondly, the rejection among unions to use these procedures, since 
they were considered to be aimed at replacing the right to strike; 
thirdly, the utility and proper working of judicial authorities on labor 
matters; given the high resort to them for conflict resolution, labor 
courts are highly specialized and effective; fourthly, the overvalua-
tion of judicial decisions to solve labor conflicts; finally, the general 
understanding that the conflict is not “really” solved until they get a 
judicial resolution. 
It was not until democracy was established and the Constitution 
(1978) approved, that the freedom of negotiations between unions 
and companies and the right to carry out industrial actions in organi-
zations were accepted (Munduate, 1993). Since that time, the Spanish 
society has progressively developed more autonomy for social part-
ners to regulate industrial relations and a higher respect for this col-
lective autonomy. As a consequence, in the 90s there has been an in-
crease in the establishment of ADR to solve labor collective conflicts. 
At a national level, the first formal proposal to resort to mediation 
and arbitration in Spain arose in 1996 and it was called Agreement 
for Extrajudicial Labor Conflict Resolution (ASEC in its original acro-
nym). The agreement was signed by the largest trade unions in 1993 
and the most representative employer associations and counts with 
the support of the national government. This agreement regulated 
collective labor conflicts, excluding interpersonal conflicts and con-
flicts on social security matters. The ASEC respects the competences 
of other regional ADR systems established in the field of labor dis-
putes. Therefore, local state systems will be considered preferential 
if so wished by the parties even if that conflict was actually the com-
petence of the ASEC. The positive outcomes of the agreement have 
encouraged social partners to improve the model. Therefore, the last 
agreement signed in 2012 has changed its name from Agreement for 
Autonomous Labor Conflict Resolution instead of extrajudicial, with 
the aim of highlighting the focus on the dialogue of the parties. 
Andalusia is the largest of the 17 autonomous regions in Spain. It 
is composed of eight provinces which, according to the census of 1st 
January 2013, have a total population of 8,421,274 people, which 
represents 18.89% of the population in Spain. According to the 
Economic and Social Andalusian Council’s report on socioeconomic 
situation in Andalusia on 2011 (CESA, 2012), the number of companies 
acting in Andalusia on 1st January was 482,334, the number of 
people over 16 years old was 6,800,725; out of this, 4,017,600 were 
integrated in the labor market. Of this, 2,627,774 (65.4%) are working 
and the unemployment rate is 34.6% (EPA, 2014).
The Extrajudicial System for Labor Conflict Resolution in Andalusia 
(SERCLA) was created by an interprofessional agreement subscribed 
by the most representative employers’ association and the two largest 
trade unions in Andalusia. The Andalusia Government also signed this 
agreement, committing to provide the necessary means for the 
effective development of the system, such as installation administrative 
facilities, personnel, technical, and material support. It finally came 
into effect in January 1999. At first, SERCLA was only competent for 
seeing collective labor conflicts. After the 2009 reform, it extended its 
competence to certain individual conflicts as well. Since SERCLA tries 
to promote dialogue, consensus, and co-responsibility of the 
disputants, it stresses mediation, being that arbitration less extended. 
In fact, in 2013 there were 1,454 collective labor conflicts and individual 
conflicts. Out of the 383 brought to SERCLA, only three were for 
arbitration – this translates as far less than 1% of the whole (SERCLA, 
2014). 
The mediation service is provided by a mediation team usually 
composed of four mediators. A genuine characteristic of SERCLA’s 
system is that trade unions and employer’s associations design a list 
of eligible mediators, so that two of them are appointed by the 
principal employer’s association, and the other two by the two 
largest trade unions’ lists, one appointed by each of them. In 
individual cases, the mediation team is composed of only two 
mediators, one appointed by the employer’s confederation and the 
other one by the trade unions. Though the mediator team is 
composed of members appointed by each association, they shall not 
act as representatives of the disputants; rather, they shall conduct 
the mediation process to assist the disputants to get their own 
agreement. Additionally, every mediation is also assisted by a 
secretary provided by the Andalusian Government. As previously 
mentioned, the reason for using this particular designation process 
of mediators is the traditional lack of trust of social partner for third 
non judicial. Employers and trade unions involved in this system 
deposit in SERCLA’s secretariat a list of at least twenty people who 
could act as mediators. There is not a strict or drawn-out procedure 
in appointing the mediators for each case – sometimes they are 
appointed because they have knowledge on the topic. But in any 
case, mediators should have participated in the negotiation of the 
collective agreement that is being discussed (SERCLA, 2014). 
The SERCLA offers compulsory mediation training for every 
mediator. The requirements to become a mediator are: to follow 
twelve-hour theoretical and practical mediation training and to 
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attend to at least three real mediators as an observer. Once mediators 
are included in the system, they shall take a re-training at least once 
every two years during their career as mediators (SERCLA, 2014).
SERCLA deals essentially with the two different types of collective 
conflicts that can arise between the social and economic partners: 
rights conflicts, and conflicts of interest (Martínez-Pecino, Munduate, 
Medina, & Euwema, 2008). Rights conflicts refer to the interpretation 
or application of norms. There is a rights conflict when a party claims 
that there has been a violation of a collective agreement or of the 
provisions of working rules; workers assert that their rights have not 
been respected. Conflicts of interest are those conflicts that pertain to 
the establishment of the terms and conditions of employment. 
Interest disputes would be those that arise when labor and 
management are involved in negotiating a new collective bargaining 
agreement, since it tries to specify the terms and conditions of the 
employment relationship (Devinatz & Budd, 1997). There are two 
ways of submitting conflicts of interest to SERCLA. One way is usually 
labeled “general conflict”. In this instance the parties request 
assistance for either an impasse or blockage in the negotiation 
process or just because they think that mediation can be helpful. The 
second way, labeled “previous to strike”, arises when the impasse 
has led to a threat of strike. 
In rights conflicts, it is compulsory for the claimant to apply to 
SERCLA before going for adjudication. It is the same situation for 
conflicts of interest in which there is a threat of strike announced by 
union organizations. In such situations, SERCLA can act in any other 
conflict voluntarily submitted by the parties. It is important to 
emphasize that even though it is mandatory to request mediation 
under certain types of conflict, it is not compulsory to settle on it. 
On the other hand, according to the agreement of the monitoring 
commission, SERCLA is competent for seeing individual claims 
regarding professional classification functional mobility and mobility 
among different categories; individual classification about transfers 
and displacements; determination of vacation periods; disputes 
about licenses and working time; and economic and retributive 
claims derived from the aforementioned (SERCLA, 2009). 
Procedure of the SERCLA
Mediation starts with the application of one person or institution. 
Depending on the type of conflict, mediation shall be requested by 
different actors. In general conflicts (either rights conflicts or con-
flicts of interest), mediation can be requested by trade unions and 
employers’ organizations whose scope of action is equal or broader 
than the scope of the conflict. In conflicts previous to strike, media-
tion shall be requested by the Strike Committee – the bodies legiti-
mized for starting the strike and the affected employers. The process 
is launched when the parties submit the application form. Any of the 
disputants can submit it directly to SERCLA and there is no need to 
inform the other that they are going to take that action. As well, both 
parties can submit together. Once the application form is received at 
SERCLA, if it is considered necessary to rectify some information it 
will be reverted to the parties so that they can rectify it within the 
following 5 working days from its receipt. In case it is not rectified 
before the deadline, the proceedings will be filed. 
SERCLA will notify the parties involved and will call them together 
usually within the following 7 working days from the reception of 
the submission or the rectification of it. In general, if no agreement 
is reached within 25 working days the proceedings will be termed as 
completed finished without agreement. Exceptionally, this time limit 
could be extended if necessary.
In mediations previous to judicial procedures and individual 
mediations (that are also a phase of the judicial individual procedure), 
limitation periods for filing the lawsuit before the employment 
tribunals are suspended. This is one of the requirements established 
by the European Directive on Civil and Commercial Matters. This 
suspension is considered a legal guarantee that protects the right to 
access to courts. Likewise, in case mediation fails, parties would have 
time to prepare their lawsuits. However, it is also important to prevent 
the misuse of mediation as a means for delaying the judicial 
procedures, so this is the reason why if in 25 days parties have not got 
to an agreement, the mediation process shall be filed by the Secretary. 
Reference Model of the Mediation Process
The mediation service is a rather flexible process. The mediation 
team, in light of the circumstances of the case and the disputants, 
conducts the mediation in any manner that they consider appropri-
ate. Mediators have autonomy in their interventions and the tech-
niques they apply. Nonetheless, SERCLA has developed a Reference 
Model for Mediation that we present next (Figure 1). 
Several aspects of this model are worth emphasizing. First, option 
A (joint sessions) in which the entire mediator team works with both 
disputants is preferred to caucus or private sessions. Second, it is 
important in this model that the mediation team remains together 
instead of dividing itself (for instance it is necessary for mediators 
appointed by employers associations to meet with employers and for 
mediators appointed by union associations to meet with employees) 
– so that, in case a caucus is considered necessary, it is recommended 
that the whole team meet with one party at a time (the team will not 
separate itself). Finally, if it is necessary to tackle the BATNA of the 
parties, it will be done in caucus. The key feature of the model is the 
cooperation of the mediators as a team. This requires specific actions 
during the different stages of the mediation process. We highlight 
some of the critical moments in the process. 
The first stage (mediator’s previous preparatory meeting) is 
oriented around the mediators so that they can prepare themselves 
to work as a team. Coordination is essential to ensure cooperation 
among them and to make the parties perceive them as a team. To get 
it, mediators need to be aware of personal preferences regarding the 
mediation process, organize diverse team tasks and decide how to 
conduct the process. The second stage is the first contact with the 
disputants. Now, mediators need to express to the parties that they 
are a mediation team and not representatives of the parties.
Observations of 26 mediation cases give indications that 
mediation teams do differ largely in the degree of cooperation 
(Martinez et al., 2008). Thus, while some teams prefer to meet some 
minutes in advance, talk among themselves, and stay together to 
receive the disputants, others meet directly with the parties. In this 
latter case, some teams are separated in such a way that the two 
mediators appointed by employers caucused with managers, and the 
two mediators appointed by unions caucused with workers. 
Occasionally, the two mediators appointed by unions separated 
themselves from worker members of different associations. These 
non-planned divisions between team members seem to reflect 
cooperation and cohesion to a lesser extent than those teams that 
remained together as a team to receive the disputants. 
At stage 3, the mediation team has to decide on the course of 
action. Now, the dilemma for the mediators is how to act and speak 
with one voice. Should the team always present a unified vision on 
the mediation, or is it acceptable for the team to have discussions or 
different opinions in front of the disputants? Our observations give 
some anecdotal impressions that mediation teams do act differently 
in this respect and develop different norms indeed. Some teams 
prefer to meet privately with the aim of sharing information and 
reaching consensus in the team, whereas other mediation teams do 
share their perspectives in front of the disputants. 
The phases of generating, assessing, and selecting alternatives 
(stages 4, 5, and 6) are again a critical test of teamwork. We observed 
that team members who had been mediating together in previous 
cases and understood each other tried to benefit more from their 
abilities and supported and assisted other members in their inter-
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ventions. As an example, we observed a team that had to make a 
suggestion that was critical for the process to go on to one of the 
disputants discuss which of the members could exert more influence 
on that disputant so that he or she could act as voice for the media-
tors. In contrast, in some mediation teams there were members who 
acted individually, making comments that took sides for one of the 
disputants and comments that were not strategically discussed and 
agreed upon by the team, leading to a complex situation.
Some differences can also be appreciated among teams that re-
mained together (either in presence of both disputants or caucusing 
with them) and those which continuously separated themselves, in 
the sense that in the former all members received all the information 
together, helping to avoid misunderstandings, whereas the latter had 
a longer chain of communications, leading to greater possibilities of 
missing and misunderstanding information.
Effectiveness of SERCLA Interventions
During these first fourteen years that SERCLA has been functioning, 
13,400 conflicts have been submitted to the system. These cases 
affected more than 400,000 companies and more than 3,000,000 
employees. It is noticeable that not all cases submitted to SERCLA are 
finally processed. Among some reasons for this, we can find that the 
parties did not rectify the application form before the deadline, the 
claimant desisted from the conflict, the strike was cancelled, or the 
defendant did not appear. The number of cases submitted to SERCLA 
has evolved from 299 in 1999, to 1,837 in 2013, 1,454, of which were 
collective and 383 individual. The percentage of proceedings that 
were finally processed has also increased from 67.23% in 1999, to 84% 
in 2013. 
In Figure 2, we present the percentage of settlements reached in 
cases finally processed since the creation of the system (SERCLA, 
2013).
If we focus on the attendance in conflicts previous to strike, this 
system has contributed to social peace from 1999: 4,473 agreements 
have been reached, avoiding the loss of 33.4 million working hours 
(SERCLA, 2013). This data estimation is based on the information 
provided in the application forms. In conflicts previous to strike, the 
claimant must give details of how many companies are affected by 
the strike, how many employees were convoked for it, and how long 
it has been predicted to last. Considering this data, it is easy to calcu-
late the working hours saved if the strike is avoided by multiplying 
the number of workers by the number of strike days and the average 
of working hours in a day. In cases of indefinite strikes, for the pur-
poses of calculation, it is considered predicted to last for three days. 
Considering rights conflicts, 3,993 agreements have been reached 
in these 14 years, contributing to a reduction of the conflict load in 
the judicial sphere. It is important to compare this latter result with 
the ones achieved previously to the existence of this system. Before 
the creation of SERCLA, there was a mandatory conciliation procedure 
conducted by CMAC (Center for Mediation, Arbitration, and 
Conciliation) for conflicts previous to a judicial avenue. We can find 
a huge difference in the percentage of agreements reached by SERCLA 
compared to the previous system. With CMAC, 4.62% and 3.76% of 
agreements were reached in 1997 and 1998 respectively, compared 
to a rate varying from 37.25% to 32.89% agreements reached by 
SERCLA from 1999 to 2013 respectively in conflicts previous to a 
judicial avenue (SERCLA, 2013). 
 If we compare percentages of agreements between types of 
conflicts, a substantial difference is appreciated. Rights conflicts get 
lower settlements rates than conflicts of interest, either they are 
conflicts of interest previous to a strike process or general assistance 
in conflicts of interest. 
In Figure 3, we compare the evolution of percentages of 
settlements depending on the type of conflict (SERCLA, 2013).
As we have previously mentioned, not all cases submitted to 
SERCLA are finally processed. The main cause for anticipated ending 
of the proceedings is that the defendant does not appear, what is 
called “intended without effect”. Besides these substantial differences 
in percentages of settlements comparing rights conflicts with 
conflicts of interest, we find another important difference in 
percentages of cases in which the defendant does not appear. In 
rights conflicts, it is more frequent that the defendant does not 
appear, compared to conflicts of interest. One possible explanation is 
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Figure 1. Mediation model in SERCLA
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that rights conflicts, compared to conflicts of interest, tend to be 
more legalistic and adversarial (Bain, 1997). Therefore, the parties 
could prefer going to courts instead of searching for an agreement in 
mediation. When the parties are locked into rigid positions for what 
they believe to be “right”, there is little to trade (Messing, 1993) and 
this may make them prefer courts to mediation.
Discussion
The main implication for other mediation systems stems from the 
involvement of both social partners in the creation of SERCLA. As we 
have previously mentioned, it was created by an inter-professional 
agreement between the two largest trade unions and the most 
representative employer association. This agreement was also signed 
by the Andalusian government as a sign of support and commitment 
to the system. The implication and involvement of both social partners 
is essential for the proper functioning of the systems. For example, De 
Roo and Jagtenberg (2002) reported about an institution introduced 
by the Dutch government that failed, as it was not developed jointly 
with the interest groups representing both sides of industry. 
Implementing a system like SERCLA could be very suitable in contexts 
with a scarce tradition to use mediation for labor conflict resolution, 
due to the confidence that it can generate in the disputants.
A second implication is that the composition of the mediation team 
where mediators are appointed by employers’ associations and trade 
unions and the successful cooperation among its members could serve 
as a model for cooperation to disputants. Negotiators are used in ex-
perienced collective bargaining as an adversarial process of confronta-
tion between groups: employers and employees. Therefore, they may 
have some negative expectations about mediation, and the level of 
trust in the process and the other party can be low. For this reason, 
SERCLA offers a cooperative model between employers and employees 
in the composition of the mediation teams. Bearing in mind social 
learning theories and the fact that people can pass on effective styles 
of behavior to others by social modeling (Bandura, 2001), we consider 
that the composition of the mediation team in the Andalusia’s system 
offers the disputants a model for cooperation. Cooperating as a real 
team of mediators appointed from opposed associations can serve as 
a model to show the disputants that cooperation between them is also 
possible. Improvement in the relationship and ability to negotiate di-
rectly has often been considered potential results of mediation (Wall 
& Lynn, 1993; Wall, Stark, & Standifer, 2001). 
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A final implication refers to the ways of dealing with neutrality 
and impartiality. This issue has evoked intense debates in literature 
and has been addressed by many authors (Arad & Carnevale, 1994; 
Bingham & Pitts, 2002; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Murray, 1997; 
Watkins & Winters, 1997; Wehr & Lederach, 1991). Impartiality and 
neutrality have often been used as interchangeable concepts. 
Nonetheless, there are analysts who consider they are different. 
Impartiality is seen to refer to unbiased opinion or lack of preference 
in favor of one or more parties in conflict during the mediation 
process, whereas neutrality refers to the fact that there are not any 
strongly positive or negative relationships between a mediator and 
the parties before the mediation occurs (Kleiboer, 1996). An 
important question is if a mediator should be neutral and if biased 
mediators would be acceptable for the parties. It can be considered 
that a mediator who has a previous relationship with one of the 
parties could not gain the confidence and acceptability of the other 
disputant and could present biases during the process. However, a 
mediator who is closer to one side could sometimes be beneficial 
(Carnevale & Choi, 2000; Carnevale, Cha, & Fraidin, 2004). That close 
relation could be useful to exert influence over the party. The 
composition of the mediation team in SERCLA, with an equal number 
of mediators appointed by each association, offers a good way to 
preserve neutrality before the mediation. In this sense, the fact that 
mediators are appointed by the associations of the parties involved 
allows the parties to feel closer to them and let mediators influence 
the parties, yet neutrality is achieved by an equal number of 
mediators appointed by employer and union associations. However, 
to benefit from this composition of the mediation team, mediators 
must cooperate to keep impartiality in their interventions during the 
process. Proper training of mediators by SERCLA regarding this issue 
is crucial in order to guarantee the success of the system (Wall & 
Dunne, 2012).
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